

The State is dead, long live the State! The declaration, contradictory to the extreme, holds to the world in bitter irony the deformed mirror of its own ambiguities. In a few, relatively restricted spheres, most people are well-fed, housed in something more than shanty-towns, and entertained by more stimuli than they can adequately handle. These are the areas where the State is most secure, and its citizens consequently somewhat insulated not only from the nasty, brutish and short existence of unbridled civil society but also from the harsh caprice of the modern prince. And yet, and yet, something still is rotten in the State of Denmark, while beyond its borders history itself seems to be going backwards.

One would have thought that Auschwitz marked a terminal point, but in vast parts of the world today practices developed by middle-Europa totalitarianism have become standard political procedure. For those dissidents which the Soviet Union has found too difficult to intern in psychiatric hospitals or labour camps the Communist Party State has developed a more traditional treatment: exile. In the West exile is perhaps looked upon as a form of liberty. It ought not to be forgotten that it is also a form of political exclusion; and in the modern world political exclusion is often an initial step towards extermination. The Nazis declared Jews stateless persons before they declared them non-persons. Today displaced persons and refugees are on the point of achieving institutionalized political status. Millions of refugees have been created in East Africa as a by-product of wars of national liberation. Their permanent homes are camps in the Sudan and Somalia, their permanent political benefactors, the United Nations High Commission⁽¹⁾. They are not alone. Israelis and Palestinians have succeeded in creating a well-nigh insoluble political conflict through a long process of mutual reduction which hinges on the nexus between people and State⁽²⁾. Self-determination justifies terrorism, occupation and the denial of the other's claim to human-ness, whose political dimension is citizenry. It is not the only ideology. In countries as disparate as Iran and Cambodia mobilizing elites have set about to remake an entire society, which

means of course remaking millions of individuals as well⁽³⁾. The consequences are notorious : massive forced internal migrations, torture and repression. And the torture is growing, year by year, country by country, outstripping the past and outstripping fantasy: Bresil, Chile, Argentina, Guatemala, El Salvador, Uruguay, to name but a few countries when torture, assassination, forced military induction, collective guilt and intimidation, even genocide on a local level, have become institutionalized state practices⁽⁴⁾. Every now and then one talks about the democratization of these regimes, just as one talks about the liberalization of the Soviet system, or the transformation of apartheid in South Africa; yet even if such talk were not ideological trappings there is still Keynes' most pertinent remark: in the long run we will all be dead.

It is already, in such dark times, a measure of achievement to list the horror shows and protest against them; but what signifies this growing statism, how to analyse it? At one level one is inclined to qualify it as a reactionary phenomenon, the last hurrah of that part of the world still trapped in the Hobbesian nightmare of underdevelopment, where authoritarian regimes, precisely because of their massive recourse to violence, are the hallmarks of political instability. In this view of modern history, the rise of the democratic state and constitutional government forms part of the institutional complex of citizenship, which has its roots in the long sixteenth century that served as the crucible of capitalist progress. This process was a long and bloody one. Enclosure movements uprooted the peasantry, creating vagabonds and workhouses. Capitalist industrialization impoverished the working-class for a century. The abolition of the Ancien Regime proved violent and sanguinary, not only for the traditional elites but also for the newly enfranchised masses. Where modernization came late, moreover, so too, it is suggested, came fascism. By the time this development had spent its force, five hundred years later, some measure of restraint on the arbitrary power of the sovereign had been achieved. The rule of law and the welfare state have become to some extent the daily option of citizens in Canada, the

United States, Western Europe and Japan: life expectancy has increased, people do not live on rooftops, parcels can be sent through the mail with reasonable confidence that customs' officials will not steal their contents. Such was not always the case. For most of human history it probably was not, and for most of the world under the sway of overtly repressive regimes, it probably is not still. Within this perspective, and only within this perspective, can the growing statism of the modernizing yet underdeveloped part of the world be construed as a phenomenon in a long state of transition, harking back to traditional forms of social control that sooner or later will reveal themselves to be incompatible with the course of modernity and progress upon which human history has embarked. Indeed, in the functionalist reading of modern history, the particular institutional complex of statist democracy is the prerequisite to that social and technological innovation wherein freedom and progress, however ambiguous, are also synonymous, and thereby the wave of the future⁽⁵⁾.

This reading of history is not implausible, yet the signs are contradictory and disquieting. Keynes' caveat aside, the repressive mechanisms of contemporary states bear little resemblance to the state apparatus of traditional *anciens régimes*. Sophisticated and methodological, they are rooted in the developments of modern technology and ideology. Not only are the means of torture highly refined, so too are the psychological procedures upon which the practice of such torture depends. Schools of torture now exist to train the practitioners⁽⁶⁾. One can well imagine the degree of psychological sophistication required to prepare them in a world which officially condemns such practices. If the Nazis relied chiefly on ideology and totalitarian isolation to indoctrinate the SS, their contemporary homologues must find such methods clumsy and obsolete, no doubt because inefficient. In this sense, torture has become part of modernity. Nor does the ideology lag for behind. What Orwell described as doublethink and newspeak has become part of official language throughout the world; nor is it merely an impression that we have heard it all before. After the failure of the German workers' revolt in 1953 Brecht wittily pointed out that the lesson for the government was clear: it was

time to dissolve the people and elect another one⁽⁷⁾. In 1980 the president of Uruguay commented upon the people's failure to ratify in a referendum the institutionalization of a military dictatorship in much the same terms, labeling it a defeat for the people⁽⁸⁾. It is a measure of the political distance travelled that the later quip came no longer from a poet, but from a president, losing in the process even the solace of irony.

Such ideological manipulation deforms torture politically into therapeutic repression. The more stable yet openly coercive regimes, like the Soviet Union or the Republic of South Africa, can thereby use law and psychiatry to hide the fact that the entire society is based upon an edifice of terror⁽⁹⁾. The edifice is, so to speak, built-in, and the political relevance of this cupboard full of skeletons resides in these regimes' capacities to legitimate such practices in the name of social institutions traditionally associated with welfare and protection. What we are witnessing perhaps is the complete subversion, in the direction of its negative pole, of the historically twin processes of public welfare and social control which accompanied and justified the rise of the modern state⁽¹⁰⁾. If so, this development raises serious questions about the whole nature of progress and of the Enlightenment whose offspring it has been christened, as well as the drift of the modern state where the elements of social control have hitherto been somewhat restrained. Perhaps, in bitter and ironic commentary upon Marx's vision of communist society, the USSR does indeed represent the resolved enigma of history, presenting to capitalist democracies the future of their own contradictions.

It is a future moreover which cuts across the traditional boundaries of Right and Left. Much as "really existing" socialist societies have usurped the progressive stand in the bourgeois project and incorporated it into their legitimation process, so too have the emerging, total societies of the third world converted socialist ideology to their own brand of Gleichschaltung. The integriste model of present-day Iran is a case in point. Its spokesmen and its apologists present a nascent and indigenous form of state control, where religious tradition is yoked to modern methods of repression, as both a legitimate model of modernization and critique of western society, godless,

materialist and, one might almost add, bourgeois. The arrangement might again almost sound familiar, but there are a few new notes in the refrain: the critique is implicitly progressive, capitalizing on the loss of transcendence in western society and seeking to offer in its place a viable model of modernity. "The great powers fear Islam because it constructs the total man' (Iman Khomeiny). The revolutionary project is not to modernise Islam but to islamize modernity: a challenge at once to the materialism and to the rationalism which constitutes the West "⁽¹¹⁾. The refrain is nonetheless replete with catchwords that in another context were labelled national-socialism: the attack on decadence, the anti-imperialist tinge, the expansionist ring, the call for total mobilization. If fascism can reappear, and this time more overtly in the ideology of modernization, then how to interpret the Nazi experience⁽¹²⁾? History no longer presents itself as irreversible, and Hitlerite Germany not only as one of capitalism's accidents, a by-product of both developmental lag and national specificity. Rather fascism seems also to be a wrong turning point too often taken, a lapse into barbarism that threatens to be the wave of the future and which, by engulfment or by ricochet, threatens to exacerbate those tendencies in the earlier and dominant project of modernization that had lent to its forms of progress their ambiguous character.

Already in the Great French Revolution, that focal point of the bourgeois project, such tendencies were present, albeit in embryonic forms, such that the problem of the French Revolution is even today the problem of the modern state. The revolution of liberty, equality and fraternity paradoxically produced a centralized state, the foundation of a modern administrative elite, a universalist ideology, modern imperialism and the Terror. Liberalism, though haunted from the outside by the social question, was riddled from the outset by its own, internal contradictions. If the revolutionaries sought the overthrow of the Ancien Regime, they also sought to maintain the essential political contours of the relationship between government and the governed. Citizens replaced subjects, but the state retained political power, and the project of freedom and democracy foundered upon the refusal of the revolutionary elites to institute new political relationships outside state forms. Vengeful reuse of the old order, it haunted the revolutionary regime every step of the way, constantly producing its unintended consequences and ultimately

sabotaging successive attempts to arrest the course of demolition and found a new order. A case in point: in the initial debates over whether to launch a revolutionary war Robespierre was opposed, justifying his reluctance in a remark that was intuitively prescient, even if he was to ignore its most democratic implications. "For him, the centre of evil was Paris, before Coblenz"⁽¹³⁾. Yet the evil that lay in Paris was not only the counter-revolutionaries, not even the poverty of the masses. It was also the possibility of communal and federative democracy that made its first appearance on the national stage. Two years earlier, however, the revolutionary regime had already staked out its position in one of its first ideological constructs that were to substitute for spontaneous politics from below: the Fête de la Fédération of July 14, 1790. Conceived in order to hedge in the municipal and federalist revolutions that were emerging parallel to the movement at Paris and Versailles, the Fête de la Fédération revealed symbolically the ultimate transformation of the revolutionary moment of 1789 into its ideological and political outcome: the union of liberty and the people via the nation-state ⁽¹⁴⁾. That union congealed, it became increasingly difficult to resolve any of the successive tensions of the revolution except by a further leap forward, into modernity and into terror.

As the revolutionary dynamic unfolded the political spectrum narrowed and the wars of factions intensified, with the people and their welfare continuously invoked as both prize and legitimation. Hence no faction could afford to be pacific, for pacifism became equated with counter-revolution and treason. The people, conveniently and functionally excluded from the political process, took their revenge upon the elites by indirectly forcing them into political adventures that ended up devouring everyone. What started as a war of defense against European reaction became an annexationist military adventure to impose a universal republic on the peoples of Europe ⁽¹⁵⁾. Liberty, unrealisable at home, became exported abroad. Its denouement emerged under the Directory in the form of Napoleon's pillage of Italy ⁽¹⁶⁾: ideology and imperialism uniting to foreshadow the plight of twentieth-century totalitarianism as fascist gangs looted foreign art treasures and Stalinist armies imposed liberation upon the

hapless peoples of Eastern Europe. As in the later period so too at the inception of modern politics the inability to resolve the tensions of democracy was not solved by exporting them abroad ⁽¹⁷⁾. The chickens came home to roost in the popular insurrections of the Parisian sans-culottes and the Vendéen peasantry, insurrections that elicited reactions on the part of the revolutionary elites reminiscent, in retrospect, of contemporary barbarism. When the Commune of Paris, for example, approached the Convention on May 25, 1793 to demand the liberation of some of their leaders, the Girondin Ismard threatened any future insurrection with the destruction of Paris on such a scale that one would have to search afterwards beneath the banks of the Seine to see if it had ever existed, and this in the name of the national interest ⁽¹⁸⁾. Two months later a Jacobin convention voted the systematic destruction of the Vendée: forests, crops, cattle seized and destroyed, women, children and the elderly deported into the interior ⁽¹⁹⁾. Over a century later similar practices were to emerge in Hitler's scorched-earth policy and Stalin's liquidation of the Russian peasantry; only now the methods measured up to the ideological ranting of the elites, racism and the dust-bin theory of history replacing the earlier incantations of liberty, progress and the republic.

Yet the underlying dynamic bears too great a similarity to ignore the fascist and communist strands that inhered in the original liberal project whose common origin lies in the insistence on the state's monopoly to define the limits of popular political participation. In a certain sense the problem of mass democracy was already the fundamental problem of the French Revolution ⁽²⁰⁾. Its statist resolution could only result in the transformation of king into nation, individual into masses and politics into ideology and administration. In the French Revolution such a revolution produced the Great Terror when it was least needed, and the ironic spectacle of an anticlerical parliament voting the French people's recognition of the Supreme Being and the soul's immortality ⁽²¹⁾. In terms of concrete institutional reform, the Thermidorean Convention and the Directory put into place a series of institutions of higher learning that laid the basis for the technocratic class that has ever since been indispensable to the admi-

nistration of the modern state. In that respect too the French Revolution was only a beginning, the integration of the Institute into the constitution of the Directory with a special section devoted to the moral and political sciences being a first, if incomplete testimony to the growing importance of a trained mandarin and their scientific rationality to modern government ⁽²²⁾. Viewed in this light, however, the bourgeois nature of the French Revolution goes beyond its somewhat partial role in the preparation of nineteenth-century French capitalism to underscore a longer project of social control, of which capitalism constitutes an historical moment and the state a pivotal institution ⁽²³⁾. That project is also the project of modernity, hence its initial rational, emancipatory and progressive appearance. Yet it also has an ideological kernel that festers around the management of democracy. Hence its persistent evocation by elites of all ideological stripes, and hence too its persistent ambiguity: progress but also regress, increased autonomy but also increased control.

It is this very ambiguity that opens up the interpretive difficulties in the analysis of the modern state. The dirigisme incipient in the early bourgeois state has mushroomed to the point where little remains of the state that is specifically bourgeois. Following this line of thought, fascism becomes a moment in the development of the modern state rather than a point of regression in the development of capitalism, a social order which favours the emergence of a technobureaucracy functionally necessary to the administration of that state ⁽²⁴⁾. Such a perspective would also explain why at different historical moments and in different political colours, the project of modernity has displayed a remarkable similarity. Where government is proclaimed for the people, but in actual fact kept in the hands of its elites, it is hardly surprising that increasing emphasis is laid on the cultural revolution as the heart of modernization. A sure indication of the continued presence of domination, this ideological formulation has been characteristic of regimes as ostensibly disparate as Nazi Germany, Maoist China and Islamic Iran. What one author has described for Latin America:

"No doubt there also exists, within the reformist or revolutionary movements, of a christian or humanist inspiration, even beneath the uniforms and the cilices, a not inconsiderable current which emphasizes the necessity of arriving at a veritable emancipation, full democracy, effective participation and real responsibility for the producers, workers and peasants. But it is only a counter-current, too often lost in a vast confusion, of the general tendency which aims at and relies on state power as the sole source of change and authority. The social origin and character formation of these activists make it difficult to see at the outset how irreconcilable and irreducible these two approaches are.

If we do not restrict ourselves to the phrases and declarations of intention, but trace the behaviour and dealings of each member of the new avant-gardes, we are forced to acknowledge that the general rule which inspires them is to arrive at a total mobilisation of resources and manpower, to see to their maximum utilisation, to assure their discipline and their management, to extort from them the greatest possible yield and to arm an economy of combat. Agrarian reform to favour the creation of a worker proletariat, the rational employment of the productive capacity to make possible investments which reinforce industrial potential, multiple organisations to assure labour productivity and discipline: such are the essential orientations. With an appeal to enthusiasm and to volunteers at the beginning, but very quickly thereafter a recourse to diverse methods of constraint.

A programme which could be qualified as socialist, for it permits in words the amalgamation of millenarian aspirations with the requirements of planning. A method which could just as well be designated in other terms, less heady and even, quite frankly, dangerous, if we were willing to push our curiosity to the point of asking who commands, who benefits and who gets to use surplus-value"⁽²⁵⁾.

another has recently confirmed for Ethiopia:

"In 1981, the members of the COPTE (the Commission on Organisation of the Ethiopian Workers' Party), which already has the appearance of a party, could be classified as follows: peasants, 1.2%; workers, 2.9%; teachers, civil servants, members of the army and other sectors of society, 95%. After a special effort at recruitment and a change in the criteria of admission, the composition had become by October 1982: peasants, 3.3%, workers, 21.7%; intelligentsia, civil servants, member of the army and other sections of

society, 75%. The figures speak for themselves. The COPTE is to be transformed into a veritable party on the occasion of the revolution's tenth anniversary, and it is not difficult to see in these conditions which social class holds and will hold power in Addis-Ababa. It is no chance accident that the celebrated writer Bealu Girma was divested of his functions as general secretary of the Ministry of Information and his latest book confiscated and banned: in it he accused the new bureaucrats of seeking only women and cars and compared them to Milovan Djilas' 'new class' " (26).

In the West too the new class is thriving and the control mechanisms increasing. It is perhaps more evident at first in the contemporary capitalist state's foreign relations: the use of international monetary institutions to maintain both third-world dependency and third-world Bonapartism ⁽²⁷⁾; the export abroad of schools of torture and techniques of pacification that have extended and refined what Hoche implemented for the Directory in the Vendée ⁽²⁸⁾; the increasing resort to ideological obfuscation and hyperbole, where incursion means invasion, national security, imperialism, and free elections a licence for repression ⁽²⁹⁾. Such developments, however, are not without their boomerang effect on the politics of the capitalist heartlands. Life there is becoming, for all the development, in many respects more difficult and anxiety-ridden. The crisis is taking root,

shattering dreams and lives. More people are on welfare or unemployed. Young people have few prospects for jobs. Birth rates are down. Families are splitting up. Borders are closing. The State is tightening up welfare provisions⁽³⁰⁾, but even as it seeks to ease its way out of welfare programmes it moves to interfere in new areas of social activity, or in old areas with new regulations: sexuality, health care, demography, immigration, space. In the Federal Republic of Germany the government has instituted policies whereby women who do not abort a child will receive a considerable payment from the State. In Canada what was once a comparatively liberal immigration policy has changed to the point where it is very difficult for foreigners to immigrate into Canada unless they are either very wealthy or particularly qualified⁽³¹⁾. In the United States the government is pouring billions of dollars into military research with the aim of transporting nuclear war into space. Underlying these and other initiatives is an international economic rivalry between the United States, Western Europe and Japan where a race for technological supremacy is promoting militarism and autarky at an increasing rate⁽³²⁾. Racism and violence have returned to haunt the constitutional democracies in forms as divergent as right-wing political movements (the FN in France), video musicals (Thriller), inexplicable out-breaks of homicide, and television. Anthony Hecht has caught the mood well in his poem, "It Out-Herods Herod, Pray You, Avoid It":

Tonight my children hunch
Toward their Western, and are glad
As, with a Sunday punch,
The Good casts out the bad.

And in their fairy tales
The warty giant and witch
Get sealed in doorless jails
And the match-girl strikes it rich.

I've made myself a drink.
The giant and witch are set
To bust out of the clink
When my children have gone to bed.

All frequencies are loud
With signals of despair;
In flash and morse they crowd
The rondure of the air.

For the wicked have grown strong,
 Their numbers mock at death,
 Their cow brings forth its young,
 Their bull engendereth.

Their very fund of strength,
 Satan, bestrides the globe;
 He stalks its breadth and length
 And finds out even Job.

Yet by quite other laws
 My children make their case;
 Half God, half Santa Claus,
 But with my voice and face,

A hero comes to save
 The poorman, beggarman, thief,
 And make the world behave
 And put an end to grief.

And that their sleep be sound
 I say this childermas
 Who could not, at one time, (33)
 Have saved them from the gas

Beneath the anxiety however lies perhaps the suspicion that it is all some-how unjustified, the crisis, the austerity, the untold repression on a world-wide scale, the sense that perhaps the real nature of the crisis is the inutility of contemporary social organization in the face of current knowledge and resources, wealth and energy. Yet the sense is only a suspicion, only a perhaps. The more dominant and immediately perceived reaction is one of frustration and powerlessness, reinforced by the admission of elites in the State and the private sector that they too are powerless to act in the face of international pressures that they cannot control. The panic produced paradoxically feeds the desire for control, nourishing in turn those social forces that will make a more authoritarian development on the part of the Western States a not wholly unthinkable or unlikely prospect⁽³⁴⁾. The very inutility of the current social set-up pushes in one sense in this direction. The automation of entire factories, the introduction of robots, the increased reliance on computers has made work as we know it obsolescent, but society still runs on the cash nexus, making work as we know it still necessary even if redundant⁽³⁵⁾. The division of labour within the societies at the capitalist center will thus come to resemble the division of labour, and rewards, within the current international order: a vast underclass in relative penury ruled and managed by an international elite whose very existence, not to mention privilege, will rest on the maintenance of a system of control in which the State,

or some modified form of it, will continue to play an important role⁽³⁶⁾. Hints of this possible scenario can already be seen in a rising proportion, if reports are to be believed, of certified educated people who are functionally illiterate.

The pernicious element in this scenario is that, though the technobureaucracy remains, power becomes diffused throughout the society, masking the elements of control that persist and fueling the impression that the State is dead. It is an element that systems theorists have themselves described, though they have regarded the progressive action evolution of society as constitutive of its very freedom: "This implies, on the one hand, a freedom of action for its individual component member units, but on the other hand, new mechanisms of control which make the functioning of such freedoms feasible at increasingly generalized levels"⁽³⁷⁾. This is a not inaccurate description of how power operates and is subjectively perceived in contemporary society, especially in those representations diffused by the media. Political discussions invariably tend to take on a therapeutic hue. The animators are invariably progressive. The participants are appropriately dogmatic or cool. But as the character in the *Man who Fell to Earth* said, (or something like this): "Television tells you many things, but it doesn't tell you the whole truth". Nothing does perhaps, but there is a method to this particular madness, the method of the order maniacs, the working of the definition of the situation into the current paradigm of control. People see a world being constructed before their very eyes, the social construction of reality which nonetheless escapes their control even as they try to manage it, or only participate. Given the structured inequality of power and resources, control is a dream whose achievement is necessarily reserved for the few; but as long as the vast majority accede to the definition, seek salvation on its terms, the system of control will continue even as it seems a system out of control⁽³⁸⁾: society as its own cybernetic action system.

This admittedly is one of the more lugubrious scenarios, and truly Orwellian. It will require certain innovations and certain convergences on an international level - east and west, north and south, state and multinational corporation - in a revamping and restructuring of the already centuries-old process known as modernization, but it is not total fantasy

except in an etymological sense. There is, however, another possible storyline, more in conformity with the functionalist and marxist traditions that have tended to see, each in its own way but in common historical accord, a slow but definite unfolding of history as progress and freedom at increasing levels of feasibility. In this evolutionist version, the more complex societies, because more adaptable, necessarily represent the future, in which autonomy and control are, and will remain, indissolubly linked; but the progress, however ambiguous, is nonetheless real, as is individual autonomy, however much accompanied by new and sophisticated forms of control. One need only look at mortality figures over the past five hundred years, or the increased openness around questions of sex and gender. Even control and its concomitant scientific rationality have certain points in their favour, being the material basis for the relative contemporary degrees of freedom, for the possibilities of unforeseeable lines of development (space travel with all its implications) and for a state of existence in which anxiety is eventually, realistically reduced. The political inheritors of this perspective are social-democracy and all its variants: hence their defence of the State, constitutional and controlled, as one indispensable element in a mediated society opening into freedom; and hence their realism.

This perspective is not implausible, but a nagging doubt persists beyond the obvious remark, already referred to, that in this perspective's time frame, we certainly will all be dead, beyond even the comparison with what could be achieved here and now to reduce anxiety, yet remains undone, and this in part because of the waste in which the State participates when it is not organizing it. The doubt also remains because of the very ambiguity of freedom and progress in the world's more liberal zones and the questions they continue to elicit. Choice is widened, yet it seems to make no difference, for the impression lingers that the choice, from sex to politics, is in reality no choice; and all the gadgetry in the world, while it has made household tasks individually easier, seems part of a process whereby child-raising as a whole has become more difficult⁽³⁹⁾. Perhaps in part this is due to the greater time people in industrialized countries now have to devote themselves to interpersonal relationships, that most inscrutable of social domains. Yet perhaps it is also a consequence

of a process in which each advance in human endeavor becomes the next link in a chain of social control rather than one more step taken to reorganize social life, simplify the domain of necessity and free time from its dominion. No sooner is human activity released from one area of drudgery than it is channelled or seduced into others whose mastery or enjoyment can only be achieved at the price of continued sacrifice, subordination or conflict. This holds as much for what goes on within the individual psyche as between the individual and the collectivity: the society of repressive desublimation⁽⁴⁰⁾, of spectacular time, in which

"...individual life as yet has no history. The pseudo-events which rush by in spectacular dramatizations have not been lived by those informed of them; moreover they are lost in the inflation of their hurried replacement at every throb of the spectacular machinery. Furthermore, what is really lived has no relation to the official irreversible time of society and is in direct opposition to the pseudo-cyclical rhythm of the consumable by-product of this time. This individual experience of separate daily life remains without language, without concept, without critical access to its own past which has been recorded nowhere. It is not communicated. It is not understood and is forgotten to the profit of the false spectacular memory of the unmemorable." (41)

Such is what often seems to mean to walk down the street in a metropolitan centre of the developed world; and it often seems to be getting harder, rather than easier.

The disagreement between what for lack of better terms can be called the positivist and critical theory perspectives hinges thus in part on a disagreement about the facts, in part on a disagreement about how to interpret them. The dominant political trends each perspective discerns nonetheless underlines what is being increasingly banished in the contemporary world: utopia and the principle of hope which the utopian spirit energetically brandishes. At the heart of the political debate over the nature of the State is the question whether a mediated society without a State but committed to freedom and, yes, even progress is possible. It is at the heart of the debate between social democracy and anarchism, between realpolitik and utopia. Yet for all their realism and empiricism, positivism and

social democracy seem to forget that the contemporary State has emerged historically from the subordination and integration of democracy's utopian elements⁽⁴²⁾, while the solutions they propose seem only to reproduce the problems they purport to resolve⁽⁴³⁾. Perhaps it is the best we have to offer, but perhaps it is not merely wishful thinking to point out that only a fundamental transformation of the structure of social organization holds out the promise of improvement on a scale equal to the task. Today perhaps more than ever, "regarding the concrete utopian possibility, dialectics is the ontology of the wrong state of things"⁽⁴⁴⁾.

Fortunately there are people and groups who continue to protest, who refuse to accept things as they are and who insist, in order for there to be some kind of future, on keeping the past from being obliterated by the present. They are the people among others who form Amnesty International, who join the peace movement, who maintain the struggle for women's rights, who work hard in the Third World, who still ask questions about the wrong state of things and seek in their answers a measure of truth that does not flinch before the vastness of the task. They would perhaps agree that "the critique of ideology... is central"⁽⁴⁵⁾ and try to live it in the face of their own contradictions. To do more is the task of politics, and to clarify the task is the task of theory.

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NOTES

1. United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Refugees, January 1984, Geneva.
2. See N. Caplan, Futile Diplomacy, (2 vols), London, Cass, 1983,1984.
3. For Guatemala see America's Watch, "Extermination in Guatemala", New York Review of Books, June 2, 1983, p.13-16. For Uruguay see Le Monde Diplomatique, December, 1983, p.9 - 13. For Argentina see Le Monde Diplomatique, October,1983, p. 22-27. See also Amnesty International, Rapport 1981, EFAI, Paris,1982 and Amnesty International, Les 'disparus', Seuil, Paris, 1981.
4. For Iran see the articles on La Révolution Islamique Iranienne, Le Monde Diplomatique, April,1984, p.12-18; for Cambodia see N. Chomsky and E. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights (2 vols), Montreal, Black Rose Books, 1979, esp. vol 2, although the point of the work is more to assess the role of the Western press than to offer an exhaustive account of events in Cambodia.
5. Though written from quite different theoretical and political perspectives, there is considerable agreement about where and when the transformation to modernity occurred. See for example, I. Wallerstein, The Modern World System, Academic Press, N.Y. and London, 1974 and T. Parsons, Social Systems and the Evolution of Action Theory, Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois,1977. For the equation of modernity and progress, however ambiguous or reluctant, see for example, F. Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life,1400-1800, (tr. M. Kochan) London,1973 and P. Chaunu, La civilisation de l'Europe des lumières, Champs Flammarion, Paris,1982. For caveats about the nature of progress and modernization see E.P.Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, Penguin,1968 and B. Moore Jr., The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Boston,1966.
6. Chomsky and Herman, op. cit., ch. 2.
7. Quoted in H. Arendt, "Bertolt Brecht" in Arendt , Men In Dark Times, Johnathan Cape, London,1970, p.213.
8. E.G.Bermejo, "La décennie honteuse", Le Monde Diplomatique,December,1983,p.11.
9. See Amnesty International, Rapport 1981, op. cit., p.33-9 for the Republic of South Africa, p.383-92 for the USSR.

10. See for example, J. Donzelot, La police des familles, Paris, Minuit, 1977 for one account of this process.
11. J.-L. Herbert, "La force mobilisatrice d'une spiritualité" in Le Monde Diplomatique, April, 1984, p.17.
12. For a review of this question see P. Ayçoberry, La question nazie, Seuil, Paris, 1979.
13. F. Furet and D. Richet, La Révolution française, Marabout, Verviers, Belgium, 1979, p.149.
14. Ibid., p.112-3.
15. Ibid., p.184-5.
16. Ibid., p.382-3.
17. See Arendt's comments on the way the nineteenth-century European imperialist adventure rebounded with a vengeance against the exporting countries in H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, N.Y., 1951.
18. Furet and Richet, op. cit., p.198.
19. Ibid., p.225.
20. See H. Sklar, Trilateralism, Black Rose Books, Montreal, 1980, esp. A. Wolfe, "Capitalism Shows Its Face: Giving Up On Democracy", p.295-307 for a discussion of the Trilateral Task Force's report on The Crisis of Democracy which signals an "excess of democracy" as a major contemporary problem.
21. Furet and Richet, op. cit., p.248.
22. Ibid., p.467-70.
23. For a truly radical exposition of this argument see G. Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, Black and Red, Detroit, 1977 translated from the French, La société du spectacle, Paris, Buchet-Chastel, 1967, Champ Libre, 1971; at the same time my reading of the French Revolution owes much to F. Furet, Penser la Révolution française, Gallimard, Paris, 1978, whose analysis of the French Revolution offers a superb discussion of the relationship between revolution and ideology and raises at nearly every page important questions about the nature of modern politics.

24. L. Lanza, "Fascism and Techno-bureaucracy" in Our Generation, Montreal, vol 12, no. 1, summer 1977, p.45-57. For a lengthier discussion on the technobureaucracy see Un collectif de recherche anarchiste, Les nouveaux patrons: onze études sur la techno-bureaucratie, Geneva, Editions Noir, 1979, translated from the Italian, I Nuovi Padroni, Edizione Antistato, Milan, 1978.
25. L. Mercier-Vega, La révolution par l'Etat, Payot, Paris, 1978, p.10-11.
26. O. Kapeliouk, "Quand le paysan est tenu à l'écart des décisions politiques" in Le Monde Diplomatique, April, 1984, p.11.
27. See for example G. Corn, "Une fructueuse renégociation des dettes" in Le Monde Diplomatique, September, 1983, p.3; F. Clairmonte, "Le pouvoir méconnu", Ibid., p.2; Chomsky and Herman, op. cit.
28. Furet and Richet, op. cit., p.339 and the ideology of pacification so widely present in the American conduct of the Viet Nam War.
29. The U.S. invasion of Cambodia was an incursion. The name of the principal political prison in Uruguay is Liberdãd. See also Chomsky and Herman, op. cit., esp. vol 2.
30. E. Shragge, "A Libertarian Response to the Welfare State" in Our Generation, vol. 15, nu.4, spring 1983, p.36-47.
31. In the Federal Republic of Germany the government would like to send a good number of that country's Turkish immigrant workers back to Turkey, while a majority of West Germans favour the departure of these gast arbeiter whom they now hold responsible for unemployment. See L Vekilli, "'Türken raus'?", in Le Monde Diplomatique, Décembre, 1983.
32. P. Chamsol, "Cette guerre que nul ne veut...", Le Monde Diplomatique, April, 1984, p. 1, 26-7.
33. A. Hecht, The Hard Hours, Atheneum, N.Y., 1978, p.67-8.
34. For one such version see R. Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect, Norton, N.Y., 1979.
35. For an initial exploration about the possibilities of the reduction of work see Adret, Travailler deux heures par jour, Seuil, Paris, 1977.

36. See N. Laurin-Frenette, "Les intellectuels et l'Etat" in Sociologie et sociétés, vol. xv, no. 1, April, 1983, p.121-9 for an initial and important exploration of the contemporary relationship between intellectuals and the State within the dominant paradigm of power and control.
37. Parsons, op. cit., p.130.
38. H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, Boston, Beacon, 1964.
39. See N. Laurin-Frenette, "Féminisme et Anarchisme: quelques éléments théoriques et historiques pour une analyse de la relation entre le Mouvement des femmes et l'Etat" in Y. Cohen (ed.) Femmes et politique, Le Jour, Montréal, 1981, p.167. For an abridged English version of this article see Our Generation, vol. 15, no. 2, summer 1982.
40. H. Marcuse, op. cit.
41. G. Debord, op. cit., section 157.
42. M. Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom, Cheshire Press, Palo Alto, California, 1982, esp. chs. 7 and 8.
43. For an example of what "the Left" has to offer see R. Debray, La Puissance et les Rêves, Gallimard, Paris, 1984; and for an interesting critique see C. De Brie, "Vers une Realpolitik de Gauche" in Le Monde Diplomatique, April, 1984, p.28.
44. T. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, (tr. E.B.Ashton), N.Y., Seabury Press, 1973, p.11.
45. Ibid., p.148.